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Abstract
We call attention on the fact that recent unprecedented technological achieve-
ments, in particular in the field of quantum optics, seem to open the way to new
experimental tests which might be relevant both for the foundational problems of
quantum mechanics as well as for investigating the perceptual processes.
1 Introductory considerations.
The crucial problem of quantum mechanics can be summarized in a very elementary
way: if one assumes that the linear evolution law of the theory governes all natural
processes, then, while in actual measurement processes (and [1] in all those measurement
like processes we are obliged to admit ... are going on more or less all the time, more or less
everywhere) linear superpositions of macroscopically different situations occur, we perceive
only one among the many potential outcomes. In a way or another (more about this in
what follows) we have to recognize that, at least at the level of our definite perceptions,
the linear laws of quantum mechanics are violated. Here we will not discuss the extremely
delicate and controversial problem of the perceptual process, but we will limit ourselves to
call attention on the fact that recent unprecedented technical improvements, specifically
in the field of quantum optics, seem to allow the preparation of linear superpositions of
states such that the terms of the superposition are able to trigger definite and different
perceptions of a conscious observer. In spite of the fact that everybody would feel confident
in anticipating the main characteristics of the final exit of the experiments we are going to
discuss we think that it is interesting to analyze them since they exhibit some completely
new features and they could, in principle, allow to get some interesting indications about
the percetual process.
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2 The problem and some standard solutions.
Usually one circumvents the just mentioned problem of reconciling our definite perceptions
with the waviness, the indeterminacy characterizing linear superpositions, by pointing out
that in actual situations one can avoid to even mention the conscious observer since the
different apparatus states whose superpositions are generated in measurement like process
are macroscopically different (the most elementary case being the one of different positions
of the macroscopic pointer of the apparatus). Even though the issue under discussion is
rather controversial, everybody would agree that the above remark is absolutely pertinent,
at least for all practical purposes. For clarity sake, let us elucidate this point by analyzing
the puzzling situation we have just mentioned from the point of view of various positions
which one can take about the theory and its interpretation.
The textbook solution. With the above expression we denote the position [2, 3] of
the founding fathers of the theory, i.e. the one which is usually referred to as
“the orthodox interpretation”. It plainly amounts to accept that there are two
evolution laws governing natural processes, the first one characterizing microscopic
systems which is linear and deterministic, the second one entering into play when
different macroscopic effects are triggered by different microscopic situations which
is phenomenologically described by the nonlinear and stochastic process of wave
packet reduction.
Obviously, such a solution has to face problems of consistency and of lack of math-
ematical precision and is considered as unsatisfactory by most scientists involved in
the debate about the conceptual implications of quantum mechanics, but this is not
the point we want to make here. For our purposes it is simply useful to remark that
if one takes such a position the problem of our definite perceptions in the above
considered cases simply disappears: even before we “look” at the apparatus, due
to the fact that wave packet reduction has taken place, the macroscopic system is
already in a macroscopically precise situation which matches our definite perception
about it.
The decoherence argument. According to this point of view [4, 5] no wave packet
reduction takes place, but the quantum nature of the “macroscopic pointer” (i.e.
its being in a superposition) cannot play, in practice, any testable role since the
interference effects to which it could (in principle) give rise are hidden or suppressed
by various mechanisms, the most typical one being its unavoidable coupling with
the environment and the ensuing decoherence. This fact can be put in a precise
mathematical form by recalling an elementary theorem about composite systems:
Suppose we consider an entangled normalized state |Ψ(1, 2)〉 of a composite system
S = S1 + S2:
|Ψ(1, 2)〉 = α|φ(1)〉 ⊗ |A(2)〉+ β|χ(1)〉 ⊗ |B(2)〉, (1)
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and let us evaluate, for such a state, the expectation value of an arbitrary projection
operator P1 of the Hilbert space of S1. We have:
〈Ψ(1, 2)|P1|Ψ(1, 2)〉 = |α|2〈φ(1)|P1|φ(1)〉+ |β|2〈χ(1)|P1|χ(1)〉
+ 2Re{α∗β〈φ(1)|P1|χ(1)〉〈A(2)|B(2)〉}. (2)
This simple equation expresses the well known fact that if the states |A(2)〉 and
|B(2)〉 of the system which is entangled with S1 coincide (〈A(2)|B(2)〉 = 1), then the
interference effects are fully exploitable, while if they are orthogonal (〈A(2)|B(2)〉 =
0), any conceivable test on the system S1 gives exactly the same outcome as the
one implied by the statistical mixture of pure states of S1 in which a fraction |α|2
of the systems are in the state |φ(1)〉 and a fraction |β|2 in the state |χ(1)〉 , i.e. the
situation characterized by the statistical operator:
ρ = |α|2|φ(1)〉〈φ(1)|+ |β|2|χ(1)〉〈χ(1)|. (3)
The conclusions which are relevant for the problem we are investigating should then
be obvious: the macroscopically different final apparatus states (which must be
identified with the states |φ(1)〉 and |χ(1)〉 of the above example) become immediately
entangled with the environment and the states of the environment associated to the
different terms (i.e. the states corresponding to |A(2)〉 and |B(2)〉) are (practically)
orthogonal. Since when an observer “looks” at the pointer he cannot “perceive” all
environmental degrees of freedom, his perceptions too, can, in practice, be identified
with those triggered by either the state |φ(1)〉, i.e. the one making legitimate the
claim “the pointer points at 1” or by the state |χ(1)〉, associated to the fact that
“the pointer points at 2”.
The Bohmian point of view. As is well known, the de Broglie-Bohm theory [6, 7, 8]
is a nonlocal and deterministic hidden variable theory which completely agrees with
quantum mechanics and attributes to all particles of the universe a perfectly definite
position at all times. For the case under consideration the theory claims that the
pointer is definitely either in one or in the other of the two positions 1 and 2, while
its wavefunction (which coincides with the quantum mechanical one) is different
from zero both in regions 1 and 2.
Within this framework, the fundamental interplay of the position variables and the
wavefunction describing the Hilbert space evolution of the physical system is the
fundamental ingredient guaranteeing the agreement with quantum mechanics. For
instance, a particle can be claimed to follow, in the two slits experiment, one and
only one of the two “possible paths” but the very fact that its wavefunction is
different from zero also on the path which it does not follow guarantees that, on
repetition of the experiment, one gets the interference pattern on the screen.
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However, it is one of the nicest and most relevant features of the theory that, while
for a microsystem the full wave function plays the just mentioned fundamental role,
in the case (like the one which interests us) of a macro-object which is in a precise
region but whose wave function is different from zero also in another region, one
can resort to the “effective wavefunction” to describe its evolution. The effective
wavefunction is simply the one obtained by dropping the so called “empty wave”,
i.e. its part referring to the region where there is no objetc. This is obviously an
approximation, but it can be proved to hold to an extremely high degree of accuracy.
Once more, with reference to our example, we could claim that the conscious ob-
server is confronted with an unambiguous and precisely definite macroscopic situ-
ation: the pointer is at a definite place and only the value of the wavefunction at
that place matters.
The spontaneous localization point of view. Recently, a new way out [9, 10, 11, 12]
from the difficulties connected with the measurement problem has been suggested.
It is based on the consideration of nonlinear and stochastic modifications of the
Schro¨dinger equation. Such modifications are due to terms describing the occurrence
of spontaneous localization processes affecting all elementary constituents of any
composite system. The characteristic trait of the approach derives from the fact
that the dynamical modifications are such that they leave (practically) unaltered all
predictions of standard quantum mechanics for microscopic systems but they induce
an extremely rapid (within millionths of a second) suppression of the superpositions
of macroscopically distinguishable states.
With reference to our problem, the various dynamical reduction models which have
been discussed in the literature lead (even though in a consistent way and as a con-
sequence of a universal dynamical equation) to the same conclusion as the standard
theory supplemented by the assumption of wave packet reduction: the superposi-
tions of macroscopically different states corresponding to different pointer positions
are dynamically forbidden. Once more, the conscious observer faces a macroscopi-
cally definite situation: the quantum ambiguity connected with superpositions has
already been disposed of by the universal dynamics which characterizes such models.
The conclusion one can draw from the previous analysis should be obvious: in a way
or another, quite independently of the position one takes about the theory and its in-
terpretation1, the standard wisdom about perceptions is restored: the perceptions of the
conscious observer can be considered, for all practical purposes, as triggered by unam-
biguous macroscopic situations. It is therefore interesting to investigate whether one can
devise situations in which one can be sure that the perceptual process is directly triggered
by a genuine superposition of different states which, when considered by themselves, would
give rise to different perceptions.
Before coming to discuss this point, a short clarifying digression is appropriate.
1We do not want to be misunderstood: we consider the macro-objectification problem as a quite
relevant one deserving hard work by theoretical physicists. But this fact can be disregarded for our
present purposes.
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3 A short digression.
To prepare the reader to the subsequent analysis it seems useful to recall a question
which has been debated in the literature several years ago [13]. Suppose we send a spin
1/2 particle in a state which is the eigenstate corresponding to the eigenvalue +1 of the
observable σx, through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus devised to measure σz. We all know
that a subsequent experiment aimed to detect whether the particle is in the upper or in
the lower of the two possible paths for it will give an unambiguous outcome: either the
particle will activate the counter on the upper path or the one on the lower one. Now
comes the question: does the reduction of the wave packet take place at the moment of the
detection or has it already taken place during the process of traversing the inhomogeneous
magnetic field? B. d’Espagnat has given the clear-cut answer: the reduction cannot take
place when the particle goes through the region of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus for the
simple reason that everybody would agree that if one were able to build an apparatus
which undoes exactly what the first one did (i.e. it induces the time-reversed evolution),
it would recombine the two wave packets and it would restore the spin eigenstate |σx = 1〉
for the particle. As a consequence, a measurement of σx would give, with certainty,
the outcome +1. On the contrary, if consideration were given to the statistical mixture
corresponding to the assumption that the reduction has already taken place, the unfolding
of the “reverse” process would assign probability 1/2 to the outcome σx = 1. The question
admits therefore a clear cut experimental answer.
Obviously, one could object that this is a “truly gedanken experiment” and that the
test is possible only “in a science fiction world” in which one can actually build an appa-
ratus which undoes precisely what the first Stern-Gerlach apparatus did to the particle.
However, we all know the way to circumvent this (appropriate) criticism by resorting to
systems involving photons. Such a procedure brings down the above experiment from
“the heaven of the conceptual possibilities” to “the real world of the actual feasibility”.
In fact, let us consider [14] a photon with plane polarization at 45 degrees impinging
on a birifrangent crystal whose ordinary ray is characterized by the horizontal and the
extraordinary ray by the vertical polarization. From the crystal two spatially well sepa-
rated rays emerge, or, to be precise, after having traversed the crystal the photon is in
the superposition of being in the ordinary ray and having a horizontal polarization and
of being in the extraordinary ray and having a vertical polarization. To check that the
superposition is still present is quite easy: one can use a mirror reflected crystal which
recombines the two states and makes them to interfere. After traversing it the photon is
polarized at 45 degrees, as one can easily check by putting a polarizer in front of a photon
detector. So we have here an example of a situation in which it is possible (and easy)
to test that before impinging on the second crystal the superposition of the “spatially
separated states” is still there.
We are now ready to discuss the experiment we want to propose.
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4 A challenge for experimental quantum optics.
The idea we are going to present in this Section is based on the simple remark that the
human visual percetual apparatus is characterized by an extreme sensitivity. As is well
known, the threshold for visual perception is of about 7 photons. To our knowledge this
is the only firmly established case in which a truly microscopic system can trigger directly
a definite perception. So, let us start by considering the case in which a bunch, let us say
of 10 photons coming from a region A, propagates towards the eye of a human observer.
The bunch hits the retina of the observer and triggers the definite perception “a luminous
spot at A”. Now we can consider an analogous situation in which the bunch comes from
a region B, spatially separated and perceptively distinct from A. Again we can perform
the experiment and the conscious observer will perceive “a luminous spot at B”.
Here comes the challenge for people working in quantum optics. Suppose we are able
to prepare a state which is the superposition of the two previously considered states,
i.e. the state2:
|Ψ(1, 2)〉 = 1√
2
[|10 photons from A〉+ |10 photons from B〉] . (4)
We also assume, and this is a crucial point of the proposal, that there is the
practical possibility of testing that actually the superposition persits for the time we will
be interested in. This means that we have a mean to recombine the two states and to
put into evidence their interference effects, just in a way analogous to the one we have
analyzed above to test the fact that the single photon is in a superposition after traversing
the birifrangent crystal. We do not know whether the present technology already allows
such a performance, but Profs. De Martini and Zeilinger have told me that the desired
result would certainly be attainable within a short time, and that, for the time being,
to actually prepare it and to perform the interference test is mainly a matter of money.
Some relevant steps in this direction have been performed recently [18, 19].
Given these facts, we think that everybody will have clear the novelty of the situation
we are envisaging with respect to the one analyzed in Section 2. Here we prepare a state
such that we can test explicitly that the quantum coherence between its terms persists
up to the moment in which the conscious observers “looks” at it. The interesting fact is
that, even though the two superposed states refer to a microscopic system, they can trigger
definite and different perceptions. Here one cannot invoke wave packet reduction, the
decoherence induced by the entanglement with the environment, the possibility of making
the approximations involved in the Bohmian analysis, or the decoherence induced by the
spontaneous localizations before the observer looks at the photons. So we can proceed.
We put our observer in place of the apparatus testing that the superposition is still there
2A state like the one we are considering has been discussed for the first time by Albert and Vaidman
[15] (see also [16]) to point out an alleged difficulty of the dynamical reduction program. We have already
answered [17] to this criticism proving its unappropriateness. In spite of that, the analysis of these
authors has obviously played a precise role for the present paper. The relevant fact, however, is that
at the time of the work by Albert and Vaidman the possibility of preparing such a state was a pure
speculative assumption, while what we are pointing out in this paper is that now to prepare such a state
seems practically feasible.
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and we investigate what are his perceptions. We think everybody will agree about the
probable outcome of the experiment: the observer will have definite perceptions and will
not end up in a confused state of mind. Moreover his perceptions will be distributed
randomly between “I perceive a spot at A” and “I perceive a spot at B”.
But we also think that to perform the experiment is of some relevance and that no
one would feel fully confident in answering to questions like: wich will be the precise
unfolding of the perception process in this peculiar and fundamentally new situation? To
make clear our point of view let us describe in greater details a precise set of experiments
(among the various ones) that can be devised.
We have an apparatus which can prepare three different kinds of photon bunches:
i) Ten photons emanating from A,
ii) Ten photons emanating from B,
iii) The above state (4).
In the first run of experiments we stimulate the visual apparatus of the observer by
choosing randomly the set-ups leading to the preparations i) or ii). Obviously the observer
will perceive a random sequences of “spots from A” and “spots from B”. In the second
run we stimulate the visual apparatus of the observer by choosing always set-up iii). We
espect that he will still perceive a random sequence of “spots from A” and “spots from
B”. But now we raise the questions: are we sure that the specific details of the perception
will be the same? For instance, are we sure that the reaction times and/or the possible
perceptual failures will be the same in the two cases? These questions are legitimate and
do not admit a naive answer (more about this in the next Section) since one must recall
that, loosely speaking, in the second run the brain has to do the “extra job” (with respect
to the one of the first run) of “reducing the superposition” of the initial nervous stimuli.
These arguments should have made clear why we consider of some interest to actually
perform the experiment: it might be that we can get from it some unespected information,
which could be of some relevance. At any rate we will at least obtain the experimental
proof that a system like our sensory apparatus, contrary to the complicated and macro-
scopic system used to test that the superposition is still there, is actually able to “reduce
the statevector”.
One could then think of more ambitious programs. For instance, the late Prof.
Borsellino has repeatedly called my attention on the fact that even quite small living
organisms can be trained to react to a light stimulus. One could then investigate the re-
actions of such organisms to see whether some differences occur when one subjects them to
one of the two above procedures. Many variants of the indicated process can be devised.
Obviously it is rather hazardous to guess that one could really learn something from such
experiments since many loopholes will in any case remain open, but at the same time it
seems to us that they have some intrinsic interest.
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5 Making our argument more plausible.
To fully appreciate our point of view and the reasons for which we believe that the pro-
posed experiment might be relevant it is appropriate to discuss a possible naive objection
against it. One could argue along the following lines. Consider the first run of experi-
ments and the case in which the preparation procedure leads to situation i). The photons
impinge on the observer’s retina and trigger the transmission of the nervous signal. Let
us consider an oversimplified description of the unfolding of the process from the initial
stimulus to an intermediate stage in which part of the brain is involved:
|stimulus i); brain state R;...〉 ⇒ |stimulus i); brain state Si;...〉. (5)
Here R stays obviously for “ready to react to the stimulus” and we have left unspecified
(for reasons which will become clear in a moment) the states of the other parts of the
perceptual apparatus which will enter into play, in particular those referring to the final
stage in which a definite perception emerge . Analogous considerations apply to the case
in which the initial state is the state ii):
|stimulus ii); brain state R;...〉 ⇒ |stimulus ii); brain state Sii;...〉. (6)
One could then remark that since in each of the experiments of the second run the
initial state is the superposition of the two above initial states, according to the linear
nature of quantum evolution, one would have:
1√
2
[|stimulus i); brain state R;...〉+ |stimulus ii); brain state R;...〉]
⇒ 1√
2
[|stimulus i); brain state Si;...〉+ |stimulus ii); brain state Sii;...〉] . (7)
For such a state, however, the subsequent occurrence of wave packet reduction (due e.g.
to the emergence of a definite conscious perception or to the uttering by the observer of a
sentence stating which perception he has experienced, or to the coupling of his brain states
with the environment), will lead precisely to one of the final states (5) or (6). Thus, the
proposed experiment would be meaningless: at the end there is intrinsically no difference
between the two types of runs we have proposed.
However, it has to be stressed that the above argument is entirely based on the as-
sumption that the linear and deterministic evolution characterizes all physical processes
and on the hypothesis, characteristic of standard quantum mechanics, that the reduction
process is essentially an instantaneous process. Moreover it is also assumed that such
a process simply selects one of the two terms of the superposition without in any way
affecting it. This is a very restrictive and unrealistic assumption. Actually, the only re-
quest that is necessary to yield agreement with our definite experience is that the final
state belongs to a precise eigenmanifold (among the two possible ones) of the observable
“my perception about the location of the spot”. Now, the idea that the assumptions
listed above are unappropriate is shared by an increasing number of scientists. We can
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mention the lucid statement by Leggett [20]: one might imagine that there are corrections
to Schro¨dinger’s equation which are totally negligible at the level of one, two, or even one
hundred particles but play a major role when the number of particles involved becomes
macroscopic, and the repeated assertions of R. Penrose [21] as emblematic examples. The
very fact that the dynamical reduction program has raised so much interest and has been
so convincingly supported by J.S. Bell, shows that the scientific community is contemplat-
ing seriously the idea that one should give up the unrestricted validity of the linear nature
of the evolution. If this is the case, the physical processes which present themselves as
the most natural candidates to get some evidence of a violation of the standard dynam-
ics are the mesoscopic processes and those processes like our definite perceptions which
(even if we know very little about them) seem to require that reduction actually takes
place. It is therefore reasonable to entertain the idea that in the case under discussion a
non linear and stochastic dynamics, the one leading to wave packet reduction and to a
definite perception, governs the process we are analyzing. Accordingly, there is no reason
to exclude that in spite of the fact that the evolutions described by Eqs. (5) and (6) rule
the process when the initial states are i) or ii), respectively, the correct equation which
actually describes the unfolding of the process and which has to replace Eq. (7) in case
iii) will take the form:
1√
2
[|stimulus i); brain state R;...〉+ |stimulus ii); brain state R;...〉]
⇒ 1√
2
[|stimulus i); brain state (Si)*;...〉+ |stimulus ii); brain state (Sii)*;...〉] . (8)
where the states (Si)* and (Sii)* are physically different (in some respect) from the cor-
responding states Si and Sii appearing in Eqs. (5) and (6). Alternatively, one could
contemplate the possibility (see the next section for an illuminating example) that the
non linear evolution might lead to a final state like the one in Eq. (7), in which, howewer,
a linear superposition with coefficients quite near but not exactly equal to 1/
√
2, appears.
Then, at the moment in which the subsequent evolution, e.g. the final act of perception
or any other physical mechanism, will induce the reduction, the actual state of the brain
would be different according to whether we are performing experiments of the first or
of the second type, respectively. In turn, these mesoscopic differences could give rise to
slight differences concerning the reaction mechanisms of the nervous system, such as, e.g.,
the average reaction times and/or possible perceptual failures.
That the present argument has to be taken seriously, can be shown by making refer-
ence to one of the theoretical models which give a mathematically precise (even though
phenomenological) account of the reduction process, i.e., the Spontaneous Localization
Models [9, 10, 11, 12]. Within such models the dynamical processes leading to the final
definite outcome and/or perception take place during appropriate time intervals which
are precisely defined by the physical context. Actually, just to answer the criticisms of
ref. [15, 16], we have analyzed [17] (even though only in a qualitative way) precisely
the visual perception mechanism. What we have proved is that one can summarize the
unfolding of the process in the following way. As soon as the superposition of the two
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stimuli excite the retina, two nervous signals start and propagate along two different ax-
ons. The process goes on and the relative weights of the two terms of the superposition
change due to the stochastic processes affecting the ions which cross the Ranvier nodes to
transmit the signal. Only when, in the process of nervous transmission along the axons
to the lateral geniculate body and to the higher visual cortex, the number of ions which
occupy different positions in the two states of the superposition reaches an appropriate
threshold, the suppression can be considered complete: only one of the two signals sur-
vives and triggers an unambiguous perception process. Has it has been shown in [17] the
completion of the process requires times comparable to the perception time. This means
that for an appreciable fraction of such a time the superposition of the two ”nervous
signals” is still present, the two terms having comparable weights. In turn, each term
will be associated to smeared electric effects involving few particles but characterized by
a spreading of the wavefunctions associated to them. Then, if one takes into account the
very structure of the theory, one realizes that the genuinely stochastic processes implying
the “spontaneous localization” of precise particles of the system, are governed by the
overall wavefunction and, as a consequence, they might exhibit different features when
one consider either situation i) or situation ii) versus situation iii). But a localization of
a particle can lead, as discussed in refs. [9, 10, 11, 12], to the excitation or dissociation
of the ion to which it belongs. In brief, the actual unfolding of the process in case iii) is
by no means the “linear combination” of the processes occurring in the cases i) and ii).
Thus, when the reduction will actually come to an end and the definite perception will
emerge, it is not unreasonable to admit that some precise and permanent record of the
fact that the perceptual apparatus has been triggered by case iii) and not by either case
i) or case ii), might remain. Whether such differences can have a systematic effect leading
for instance to an increase of perceptual failures and errors or to a change in the reaction
time is a fact that we cannot give for granted but which we cannot even exclude.
Obviously, due to the fact that the considered dynamical reduction models have only
a phenomenological status and that it has not be possible to test them against quantum
mechanics, due to our extremely vague knowledge of percetual processes and so on, one
cannot take at its face value the above argument and one cannot be precise about the
differences we have to look for. But the general argument is surely correct: if some mech-
anism is present in nature which actually leads to reductions (and as such it must violate
the linear nature of standard quantum mechanics) then this fact by itself implies that, af-
ter the reduction process has taken place and has led to a definite “outcome/perception”,
the final state of all systems which have entered into play in the process will be, in general,
different according whether the final perception has been triggered by a state which could
lead to different perceptions or it has been triggered by a state which can only lead to
the one which actually occurred. To clarify further this point it seems usuful to discuss in
detail a dynamical reduction toy model which allows to focus the specific features of dy-
namical reduction theories in the case in which the reduction process becomes competitive
with the hamiltonian evolution.
6 A detailed study of a simple dynamical reduction
model.
In this section we will consider a dynamical reduction model of the type of those intro-
duced in refs. [9-12]. However, since we intend to mimic the unfolding of a dynamical
process in which a microscopic state triggers a process which takes an appreciable time (let
us say of the order of the perceptual times) to lead to the situation in which the nonlinear
and stochastic processes inducing the reduction become effective, we cannot disregard
(as one usually does when discussing the suppression of superpositions of macroscopically
different states - like “|pointer here〉+|pointer there〉”), the hamiltonian part of the evo-
lution equation. This can be easily understood: as discussed in refs. [9-12], in the case
of superpositions corresponding to different locations of a macroscopic object the effec-
tive spontaneous localizations occurs with an extremely high frequency λ ∼= 107sec−1.
Then, for a macroscopic system, the hamiltonian evolution during two successive local-
izations cannot change appreciably the state of the system and can be disregarded. As a
consequence the state
|Ψ〉 = a|pointer here〉+ b|pointer there〉. (9)
will be transformed, with probabilities exactly equal to |a|2 and |b|2 into one of the two
terms of eq.(9).
The situation we are facing here is quite different: we are considering the unfolding
of a physical process which at the beginning involves few particles, and consequently
no appreciable contribution can derive from the nonlinear terms and the evolution is
essentially the hamiltonian one. Subsequently, the linear and nonlinear dynamical terms
become competing up to the moment (after about 10−2sec) in which the reducing terms
govern the game. To get an idea of how things could go for the case we are interested in
we have to consider a model in which the time between two successive reduction processes
is such that, during it, the hamiltonian evolution can modify appreciably the state of the
system. The detailed discussion of a situation of this type will allow us to focus some
extremely relevant features of dynamical reduction theories.
The most elementary model in which a competition between the hamiltonian and the
stochastic and nonlinear terms can be explicitly studied is the one of a system whose
associated Hilbert space is two-dimensional. Obviously, such a toy model has nothing to
do with the actual unfolding of a perceptual process. But our aim is simply to identify
some precise formal features which characterize the evolution. Actually, for our limited
purposes, it will not even be necessary to discuss the dynamical behaviour at the individual
level (i.e. to follow the stochastic evolution of each individual physical system), the
relevant information being deducible directly from the statistical operator.
We will therefore consider a dynamics of the GRW or of the CSL type (individual
discontinuous or continuous reductions) and the evolution equation for the statistical
operator that it implies. Let us be more precise about the details of the process. We have
a system S in a two dimensional Hilbert space and we suppose that the linear part of its
11
evolution is governed by the Hamiltonian:
H = h¯ω
∣∣∣∣∣ 0 AA∗ 0
∣∣∣∣∣ , |A| = 1, (10)
while the analogous of the spontaneous localizations are reductions on the one-dimensional
manifolds identified by the projection operators:
P+ =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1 00 0
∣∣∣∣∣ , P− =
∣∣∣∣∣ 0 00 1
∣∣∣∣∣ . (11)
The reduction processes are assumed to take place with a mean frequency λ.
The dynamical evolution equation for the statistical operator is of the Quantum Dy-
namical Semigroup type and reads:
dρ
dt
= − i
h¯
[H, ρ] + λP+ρP+ + λP−ρP− − λρ. (12)
If we write
ρ(t) =
∣∣∣∣∣ r(t) β(t)β∗(t) 1− r(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ , (13)
the evolution equations are:
dr(t)
dt
= 2ω [Im(A)Re(β(t))− Re(A)Im(β(t))] (14)
dRe(β(t))
dt
= ωIm [A {1− 2r(t)}]− λRe(β(t))
dIm(β(t))
dt
= −ωRe [A {1− 2r(t)}]− λIm(β(t)).
A general theorem by Spohn [22] guarantees that, in the finite dimensional case, if
a Quantum Dynamical Semigroup equation admits a steady solution, then the general
solution converges to it for t→ +∞. In our case the steady solution is ρ(t) = 1
2
I. Taking
into account this fact one easily writes the general solution of our problem:
r(t) =
{
2ω
λ∆
[Re(A)Im(β(0))− Im(A)Re(β(0))] + 4ω
2 [1− 2r(0)]
λ2∆ [1−∆]
}
e−
λ
2
(1+∆)t
−
{
2ω
λ∆
[Re(A)Im(β(0))− Im(A)Re(β(0))] + 4ω
2 [1− 2r(0)]
λ2∆ [1−∆]
}
e−
λ
2
(1−∆)t +
1
2
Reβ(t) = aIm(A)e−
λ
2
(1+∆)t + bIm(A)e−
λ
2
(1−∆)t
+ [Re(A)Re(β(0)) + Im(A)Im(β(0))] Re(A)e−λt (15)
Im(β(t)) = [Re(A)Re(β(0)) + Im(A)Im(β(0))] Im(A)e−λt
−aRe(A)e−λ2 (1+∆)t − bRe(A)e−λ2 (1−∆)t.
12
In the above equation we have put:
∆ =
√
1− 16ε2, ε = ω
λ
. (16)
We have now to choose precise values for ω and λ. Let us suppose that ε is smaller than
1
4
. From eqs. (15) we see that ρ(t)→ 1
2
I for t→ +∞, independently from its initial value
ρ(0). This, in particular, means that for extremely long times the reducing dynamics will
not work as one would like, i.e., it will not transform the pure state |Ψ〉 = a
(
1
0
)
+b
(
0
1
)
into either
(
1
0
)
or
(
0
1
)
with the desired probabilities |a|2 and |b|2 , respectively 3.
Suppose now that ε is quite small. Then, within the time interval λ−1 << t <<
(4λε2)
−1
we have:
e−λt ≃ 0, e−4λε2t ≃ 1, (17)
and the statistical operator is practically diagonal with diagonal elements corresponding
(almost exactly) to the probability of reduction on the desired manifolds. In fact, eval-
uating, for the considered time interval and at first order in the small parameter ε, the
explicit form of the element r(t) of ρ(t) for two different initial conditions, i.e.:
ρMixt(0) =
( |a|2 0
0 |b|2
)
, (18)
ρPure(0) =
( |a|2 ab∗
a∗b |b|2
)
,
corresponding, respectively, to the statistical mixture
ρMixt(0) = |a|2 P+ + |b|2 P−, (19)
and to the pure state
ρPure(0) = |Ψ〉 〈Ψ| , |Ψ〉 = a
(
1
0
)
+ b
(
0
1
)
, (20)
we have:
rMixt(t) = |a|2 , rPure(t) = |a|2 − 2ε [Re(A)Im(ab∗)− Im(A)Re(ab∗)] . (21)
In the considered approximation the off-diagonal elements of ρ(t) are equal to zero in the
first case and of order ε in the second.
Eqs.(17) and (21) teach us a quite interesting lesson:
i. The reduction regime can last only for a certain (possibly extremely long) time
interval,
3Actually, in the realistic case of the GRW and CSL models the situation is even worse since ρ(t) does
not have a precise limit for t→ +∞ (see, however, the comments following eq. (21)).
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ii. The dynamical reduction process can lead, in such a time interval, to different
situations according whether the initial condition corresponds to a statistical mixture of
two states with weights |a|2 and |b|2 or to the superposition with coefficients a and b of
the same states.
Obviously, the two above facts do not change in any way the relevant implications
of the GRW and CSL theories. In fact, such theories lead to the objectification of the
positions of macroscopic bodies, and, more generally, to a definite [12] average mass
density distribution (the average being evaluated on cells of the order of 10−15cm3 around
any chosen space point r ). If one would establish a correspondence between the dynamics
of these theories and the one of the toy model we have analized in this section, one should
take into account that the average effective localization frequency for a macroscopic object
within the GRW and CLSL models corresponds to the choice λ ≃ 107 sec−1. Moreover, the
hamiltonian cannot induce, during the time interval between two reductions, appreciable
transitions between the different macrostates to which the reduction mechanism leads, so
that one can assume ω ≃ 0. Concluding, in the macroscopic case the dynamical reduction
models lead to a definite macroscopic situation in extremely short times and such a
situation persists (in absence of other dynamical processes) practically forever.
Let us now analyze the case in which the hamiltonian evolution and the reduction
mechanism are competitive. Since we want to mimic a perception process we could tenta-
tively make in the above toy model the following choice for the parameters characterizing
it:
λ ≃ 102 sec−1, ε ≃ 10−4. (22)
The first choice corresponds to the idea that the time which is necessary for a definite
perception to emerge is of the order of one hundreth of a second, the second is done in order
to guarantee that the statistical distribution of the reduced states is (almost) perfectly
respected, i.e., that the asymptotic regime leading to the equal weight distribution of
the two outcomes (independently from the triggering state), cannot become immediately
effective. That this is the case follows from the fact that the above choice implies 4λε2 ≃
10−6 sec−1 .
We can now discuss some particular cases. Suppose one chooses in eqs. (18), a = b =
1√
2
, and in eq. (10), A = i. Then eqs. (21) become:
rMixt(t) =
1
2
, rPure(t) =
1
2
− ε ≃ 1
2
− 10−4. (23)
If we take this result as giving some indications about the perception processes we have
analyzed in section 5, we are led to conclude that when we trigger the perceptual appa-
ratus with the exact 50%-50% mixture of the states |stimulus i)> and |stimulus ii)>, the
observer perceives precisely as many ”spots at A” as ”spots at B”. On the contrary, when
triggered by the superposition 1√
2
[|stimulus i)〉+ |stimulus ii)〉], he will tend to perceive
a slightly larger number of ”spots at B” than ”spots at A”.
Two remarks are at order:
i: We do not intend to suggest that the toy model has to be taken as appropriately
mimicking the perceptual process. Our analysis has to be considered as a rigorous proof
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that when the reduction process takes some time to be completed and is competing with
other processes, then, within the only known consistent theory describing such a process,
some precise differences between the outcomes generated by an initial statistical mixture
and a pure state (for which the squares of the moduli of its coefficients coincide with the
weights of the statistical mixture) can, and, in general will, actually emerge.
ii. We stress that if one goes through the same calculation by changing the sign of the
second term of the superposition we have chosen as the initial state (i.e. if consideration
is given to the state 1√
2
[|stimulus i)〉 − |stimulus ii)〉]), then the expression for r(t), in the
considered approximation, is r(t) ≃ 1
2
+ ε. The change of sign in front of ε is extremely
important. If the corrections to 1
2
would not cancel when the + or - signs are considered,
one could use the difference in the probabilities of the two outcomes to set up a device
allowing faster-than-light signalling. This cannot happen, and actually there are many
proofs (the first one having been exhibited by J. Bell [23]) that the GRWtheory (as well as
all models involving dynamical reductions of the type of CSL) cannot lead to superluminal
communication.
Concluding: we have analyzed in detail a toy model of dynamical reduction in which
the hamiltonian dynamics and the reduction mechanism compete and we have proved that
it allows to distinguish between an initial state corresponding to a linear superposition and
a statistical mixture with the appropriate weights. Obviously, since we have dealt with a
two dimensional Hilbert space, the difference could only consists in a slight discrepancy
of the probabilities of the two outcomes. It is trivial (even though a little bit tedious) to
show that when analogous dynamical conditions (the competing of the linear and nonlinear
parts of the dynamics) occur in a system whose Hilbert space is higher-dimensional and
in which the reductions occur on degenerate manifolds, the differences originating from
different initial situations could also derive from the different composition of the final
ensemble within the manifolds to which reductions lead. We have worked out detailed
calculations for a four-dimensional case with reduction on two orthogonal two-dimensional
subspaces: we do not reproduce our results here since they involve quite cumbersome
formulae. Those who have followed our argument can easily grasp that things actually go
as indicated above.
The analysis of this section makes, in our opinion, quite plausible the general argument
developed in the previous sections.
7 Concluding remarks.
We think that the above analysis, even though it gives only some general hints about
what might emerge in the experiments we have proposed, shows that it is worth to ac-
tually perform them. The proposal identifies new ways (which only recent technological
developements have made possible) of investigating such fundamental processes like the
violation of the linear nature of quantum mechanics and the formation of definite per-
ceptions. As already mentioned, R. Penrose [21], as well as many other scientists, have
repeatedly suggested that strict links should exists between the possible violation of the
linear Schro¨dinger evolution and the perception mechanism. The present proposal points
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out that there is a possibility of performing experiments which might throw some light
precisely on the crucial problems we have mentioned.
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